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Abstract
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(including communications) move people, goods and information. The large size and capital-intensive
nature of transport operations caused unprecedented organisational challenges for companies. The
identification of transport as a form of social overhead capital, supporting production across the
economy, helps account for its broad-ranging impact on economic development. In this role transport
contributed to the efficient allocation of resources over space, thereby promoting competition between
producers, and providing information about alternative consumption possibilities to consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
Transport has long been viewed as of central importance to modern
British economic history.1 More than forty years ago, Rostow (1960: 302)
viewed the railway as the ‘leading sector’ of the British economy of
the mid-nineteenth century, driving broader economic modernisation
through its strong intersectoral linkages. This early interest in the developmental role of transport has given way more recently to a closer
1

This chapter has beneﬁted from feedback provided by Joel Mokyr, Paul Johnson, Martin
Daunton, Peter Wardley and other participants at the 2001 London conference that discussed chapter drafts. Paola Crinnion provided valuable research assistance.
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understanding and recognition of its pioneering contribution to behavioural and structural elements of economic change, particularly in
terms of government intervention and corporate innovation.
This chapter will describe the process of transport growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then focus more closely on its political, organisational and developmental impact. Transport systems (including communications) move people, goods and information. This chapter
will look at each of these functions in order to reveal the pervasive role
of the transport industry in modern British history. The tendencies for
transport infrastructure to take the form of a public good, open to all
users, and for some transport services to operate in a manner similar to
a monopoly explain the interest shown in the industry by governments
seeking to assess the private and public costs and beneﬁts involved. The
large size and capital-intensive nature of many operating units caused
unprecedented organisational challenges for transport companies. The
identiﬁcation of transport as a form of social overhead capital, supporting production across the economy, helps account for its broad-ranging
impact on economic development that has been the focus of much of
the historiography. In this role transport contributed to the efﬁcient allocation of resources over space, thereby promoting competition between
producers, and providing information about alternative consumption possibilities to consumers.

PA T T E R N S O F T R A N S P O R T D E V E L O P M E N T

Roads
Concerted efforts were made to improve the quality of the road system in
the eighteenth century. Levels of maintenance had not been commensurate with actual or potential demand from road users. Parishes previously
provided road maintenance in their vicinity but the neglect of such duties led to the transfer of responsibility to ‘turnpike trusts’, beginning in
the mid-seventeenth century. Access to these roads was through a turnpike, and users had to pay a toll towards the upkeep of the road. The
trusts consisted largely of local entrepreneurs with a strong private interest in road maintenance. The ﬁrst turnpike trust was established by
act of parliament in 1663. After a slow start, the number of turnpikes
increased rapidly with the economic expansion of the 1750s and 1760s.
Further booms occurred in the early 1790s, 1809–12 and the mid-1820s.
In the ﬁrst of these booms turnpike trusts were established across many
areas of Britain; in the second and third phases expansion was particularly linked with the port and dock activities of wartime; and in the
ﬁnal period the industrial expansion of Lancashire and Yorkshire provided a strong incentive. By the mid-1830s around 22,000 miles of roads
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had been turnpiked or entrusted to Improvement Commissioners, representing about one-ﬁfth of all roads (Barker and Gerhold 1993: 37–8). In
a similar fashion, bridge trusts often bore responsibility for the maintenance of bridges and the rapid growth in their construction from the late
eighteenth century through to 1830 (Ginarlis and Pollard 1988: 208–12;
Harrison 1992: 246, 259–60).
Accompanying these improved institutional arrangements were important developments in road building and haulage technology. John
Metcalfe, Thomas Telford and John McAdam have been given much of
the credit for the improved quality of roads from the later eighteenth
century. Roads were strengthened by packing broken stones into them,
and drainage was improved by developing convex surfaces. By 1829 concrete was also being used in roads. Many more tunnels and bridges were
constructed in order to avoid steep gradients and long contours, which
helped roads to handle heavier trafﬁc and to be passable in inclement
conditions. Gerhold (1996) has recently argued that road haulage technology, not road systems, was the key explanation of the growth of
road transport services. Improved breeds of sturdier horses ate less and
worked harder, and some improvements in wagon design predated the
turnpike trusts. Of course, better roads and vehicles went hand in hand:
better roads facilitated the shift to lighter more capacious wagons by
providing harder, smoother, dryer surfaces with less steep inclines. The
consequence of these combined improvements was larger loads, higher
speeds, and longer continuous periods of travel, including more overnight
movements.
How rapidly did road transport grow? Road transport took many forms,
most obviously passenger conveyance and goods shipment including the
mail, but a distinction is also drawn between London, provincial, local
and private carriers of goods (Barker and Gerhold 1993: 19–33). Several
estimates have been made of the growth of the London cargo carriers
travelling to the provinces, for whom a variety of evidence survives from
directories, advertisements, legal proceedings and business records. Estimates of the growth of capacity (number of weekly services) and output (ton-miles) both show a substantial annual compound growth rate:
0.7 to 1.8 per cent in the former and 1.0 to 2.8 per cent in the latter
for 1681–1840 (Table 11.1). For passenger services from London to the
provinces, growth rates of weekly services and passenger miles come to
1.9 per cent and 2.8 per cent respectively for 1715–1840 (Table 11.2). It
is more difﬁcult to estimate the growth of local and private carriers,
for whom little evidence survives. Services were often irregular and undertaken by small carriers, who sometimes combined this with cartage
work on farms at harvest and other busy seasons. Distances covered were
mostly as little as 25 or 30 miles, and carriers rarely required specialist
premises because of the smallness of their operations (normally one or
two carts) and their ability to complete most tasks on the same day.
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Table 11.1 Growth of the London carrying trade, 1681–1840
Index of ton-miles
(1765 = 100)

Services per week
Chartres and Turnbull
1681

372

Gerhold

348

1705

453
611

1738
1765
1796–8

Annual compound
growth (%)

31

74,700

17

990

493

100

100

243,500

1,662

565

169

111

269,800

113

274,300

608
3,246

1826
1838–40

Gerhold

422

1808
1816–18

Gerhold

346

1690
1715

Chartres and Turnbull

per week
Ton-miles

823

344

1,025

140

340,700

152

369,800

6,113

1,093

571

149

362,200

1.8

0.7

2.8

1.0

1.1

Notes: Figures from Chartres (1977), Chartres and Turnbull (1983), and Gerhold (1988). Chartres and Turnbull’s index of services per week,
1715–1840, has been converted to actual services on the basis of Chartres’s figure for 1715. Gerhold’s figures exclude services covering less than
20 miles to London.
Source: Barker and Gerhold 1993: 22, Table 2.

Table 11.2 Growth in passenger services to selected provincial centres, 1715–1840
Year

Service
quotient

Index
(1796 = 100)

Passenger
miles (000)

Index
(1796 = 100)

1715

158

10

67

7

1765

279

18

123

12

1773

376

24

183

18

1796

1,596

100

1,040

100

1816

2,060

129

2,043

197

1840

1,765

111

2,369

Annual compound
growth (%)

1.9

228
2.8

Note: Service quotient refers to a quantum of the weekly frequency of coach departures from London to
thirty-eight major provincial cities.
Source: Chartres and Turnbull 1983: 69.

Better roads and road transport substantially improved the operation
of services: average travel times declined by 20 to 30 per cent over the period 1750–1830 (Jackman 1916: 335–6) and carriers could offer a greater
range of service types, from slow coaches to ﬂying wagons (faster but
higher price), depending upon whether speed or cost was more important. Regularity was enhanced by less seasonal laying up, as only the most
severe winter weather made the new roads impassable. These changes undoubtedly reduced the input costs of transport, and the increased competition associated with the extension of services led to these lower costs
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being passed on in the form of lower freight rates (Pawson 1977: 297;
Barker and Gerhold 1993: 40–3). Contemporaries noted that road transport charges were falling, perhaps by as much as a third (Albert 1983:
55–6). None the less, road carriage remained more expensive than by inland waterway or coastal shipping, particularly for long hauls of bulky
materials.

Inland waterways
In the half century or so before 1750, navigational improvements had
been made to a number of rivers in response to expanding internal trade.
Channels had been cut across winding bends and shallow areas deepened. However, from the second half of the eighteenth century there was
heightened interest in the construction of canals, which are deﬁned as
deadwater navigations, built as directly as possible, avoiding obstructions
such as weirs, and incorporating an adjacent towpath for haulage and
locks to adjust to altitude changes. The Sankey Brook Navigation, which
was partly opened in 1757, connected the coal mines of St Helens with the
river Mersey. The Bridgewater Canal, which was opened in 1761, joined
the coal mines of the duke of Bridgewater at Worsley with Manchester.
Although the change from river improvement to canal was gradual, these
two waterways are often viewed as symbolising the beginning of a period
of intensive canal construction that lasted until at least the end of the
French Wars in 1815. The demand for transporting bulky raw materials
that lay behind their construction reﬂected the type of service to which
canals were best suited. Although the Bridgewater was a short local canal
it was soon followed by longer trunk canals connecting different regions,
including the Forth and Clyde Canal in 1790, which gave Edinburgh access
to the commercial waterway of the Clyde, and the Leeds and Liverpool
Canal in 1816, which crossed the Pennines.
In a similar fashion to the turnpike trusts, canal construction required
the authority of a private Act of Parliament, and these acts provide a proxy
for the intensity of waterway expansion. Table 11.3 shows that in the
decade and a half from 1760 canal construction proceeded rapidly. This
was then followed by a slowdown for about a decade until expansion rose
to a peak in the ﬁrst half of the 1790s. High levels of construction continued through the ﬁrst three decades of the nineteenth century, by which
time the British canal network was all but completed, with the major
exception of the Manchester Ship Canal, which was ﬁnished in 1894. The
mileage of all inland waterways in England and Wales grew from 1399
in 1760 to 3876 in 1830, a growth rate of 1.4 per cent per annum, with
most of this growth attributable to canal construction (Duckham 1983:
109).
Although we lack reliable data on the growth of waterway trafﬁc, expansion was heavily orientated towards freight trafﬁc, especially in bulky
goods, such as coal and other minerals, and where only a low rate of
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Table 11.3 Growth of inland waterways, 1760–1830
Years

Mileage

New acts

All acts total

1760

1,399

1760–4

–

6

6

1765–9

–

23

29

1770–4

–

23

52

1775–9

–

13

65

1780–4

–

11

76

1785–9

–

11

87

1790–4

–

82

169

1795–9

–

44

213

1800–4

–

47

260

1805–9

–

44

304

1810–14

–

37

341

1815–19

–

30

371

1820–4

–

21

392

1825–9

–

35

1830

3,876

Annual compound
growth (%)

1.4

–

427
–

Note: In most of these years the vast majority of acts were for extending the powers of existing companies or
navigation undertakers.
Source: Duckham 1983: 106.

dispersion in their delivery was required. Many of the earliest canals
were promoted and ﬁnanced by individual entrepreneurs for the beneﬁt of their ﬁrms. They were mostly connected with the industrialising
regions of Lancashire, the West Midlands and South Wales. The Trent
and Mersey (‘Grand Trunk’) Canal, which formed a link between the west
and east coasts of England, was completed in 1777. Its promoter, Josiah
Wedgwood, used the canal to ship his pottery to the ports of Hull and
Liverpool and receive the raw materials of coal and clay. By the 1790s,
canal construction had become more widely spread in terms of geographical location, goods carried and numbers of investors, the latter often as
part of joint-stock companies. As such, the canals played their part in
weaning investors away from government bonds towards a capital market in industrial ﬁnance.
The leading canal engineers, men such as Thomas Telford, John
Smeaton, the Whitworths and the Rennies, faced enormous natural obstacles, which required the construction of tunnels, cuttings, embankments,
bridges and aqueducts. Such works took many years, as can be seen from
the long lag in completing the trunk canals: the Forth and Clyde was
completed in 1790, twenty-two years after its act was passed, while the
construction of the Leeds and Liverpool took from 1770 to 1816. Waterway
transport was largely undertaken in narrow boats pulled by horses from
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the towpath. There was little use of steam on canals before the middle of
the nineteenth century, and even then its use and effectiveness was limited by the narrowness of many canals. Fly boats became common during
the early nineteenth century. Like the ﬂying coaches on the roads, they
used relays of horses, ran to regular timetables, and often worked all
night.
Thus, there were only limited improvements to speed from the canal
era. Even the progress of relays of horses was constrained by the time
taken to pass through locks. Nor was regularity much improved, since
narrow canals could easily ﬂood or freeze over in winter. However, the
canal era did create signiﬁcant additional transport networks, both to
make connections between existing river systems and to bring water
transport into new areas. Canals reduced transport costs, particularly of
bulk cargoes such as minerals on longer distances (see chapter 15 below).
Duckham (1983: 131) has estimated a saving of 50 to 70 per cent in the
bulk trades, though this ﬁgure ﬂuctuated substantially according to the
distance carried and the extent to which road transport was still needed
at the beginning and/or end of the journey: canals rarely delivered door
to door, thus involving expensive transhipment costs compared with journeying entirely by road.

Shipping
The shipping industry faced huge increases in demand in both the
coastal and overseas trades in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
in response to industrialisation, international specialisation of production, and colonialism. Increased household and factory demand for coal
‘fuelled’ the growth of its interregional trade, particularly that sourced
from South Wales and the north-east of England. Rapidly growing volumes of grain, livestock and building materials were all being shipped
around the coast of Britain in response to population growth and industrial expansion. In the nineteenth century, European industrialisation
and the emergence of the steamship stimulated a major expansion of
coal exports. Coastal passenger services covered most British ports by the
early nineteenth century, particularly serving business travel and leisure
excursions. Their comfort and convenience prevented their immediate
extinction by the railway in the mid-nineteenth century. Coasters continued to provide a larger share of domestic transport output (ton-miles)
than railways throughout the nineteenth century (Armstrong 1987: 176).
Most foreign deployment of the British ﬂeet had been found in Europe
at the start of the eighteenth century, particularly in the Mediterranean,
the North Sea and the Baltic. Over the next century and a half, growing
numbers of vessels entered longer-haul intercontinental foreign trades,
particularly as a result of British inﬂuence over, and settlement of, distant
lands in the Americas, Africa, Australasia and Asia. These trades required
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large amounts of tonnage because of their long distance; additionally,
this involved the carriage of some bulky cargoes such as timber, wool,
raw cotton, slaves and migrants. Major technological and organisational
advances were essential to enable British shipping to respond to this huge
increase in demand.
Steamboat experiments took place on the Clyde in the ﬁrst decade of
the nineteenth century and they were shortly in use as river craft. By
the 1820s and 1830s larger engines and more efﬁcient paddles brought
steam into coasting. In the 1840s paddles were replaced by more efﬁcient screw propellers and in the following decade the compound engine
was patented. Further improvements in engine efﬁciency with the triple
and quadruple expansion engines and the turbine, together with the
use of high-pressure boilers, made the steamship efﬁcient on most of
the ocean trade-routes (Fletcher 1958: 557; Henning and Trace 1975:
365–8). Steam in shipping brought higher speeds, shorter distances since
vessels no longer had to pursue circuitous courses in search of trade
winds, and greater regularity through not being reliant upon the vagaries of changing wind directions. Iron and then steel provided greater
strength, safety and space in vessel construction. Speciﬁc vessel types
suited to particular trades were developed, including ‘reefers’ (refrigerated ships), tankers and ore vessels. Sailing vessels remained an important part of the shipping ﬂeet through the nineteenth century (see Table
11.4), beneﬁting from some of these innovations, such as iron construction, and improvements in sailing and design efﬁciency. However, the
number of sailing vessels was in absolute decline from the 1860s, and
the tonnage of steamships overtook that of sail in the mid-1880s.
Infrastructural developments resulted from the new technologies, including a network of bunkering stations, improved port facilities to accelerate the turnaround of expensive steamers, and the reorganisation of
shipyards to adapt to the new construction technologies. Improvements
in port facilities, navigational aids (for example the chronometer, the
quadrant and lighthouses) and stowage methods additionally enhanced
the productivity of a ton of shipping (North 1958; Walton 1967; Ville 1986;
Harley 1988; Menard 1996). The laying of the ﬁrst transoceanic cable in
1866 by Brunel’s Great Eastern steamship, with connections to Japan and
Australia by the early 1870s, vastly accelerated international communication, to the great beneﬁt of shipping companies and other international
business organisations.
The organisation of ship owning experienced important changes associated with several phases of increased specialisation: the emergence
of specialist ship owning ﬁrms in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century and the gradual division of the industry into liner companies and
tramp owners in the second half. The initial specialisation involved the
emergence of a separate occupation of ship owning, decoupled from the
mercantile or shipbuilding functions. It was facilitated by the growth of

2,096
−0.2

23,189
19,938
14,181
10,773
−0.9

1870

1880

303

1890

1900
7.2

9,209

7,410

5,247

3,178

2,000

10.1

7,208

5,043

2,724

1,113

454

168

0.4

19,982

21,591

25,185

26,367

27,663

25,984

Sources: Mitchell and Deane 1962: 217–19.

1.7

9,304

7,979

6,575

5,691

4,659

3,565

Notes:
1. Tonnage figures are net.
2. The Isle of Man and the Channel Islands are included in this table.
3. Carrying capacity reflects the growth rate of steam shipping; thus steamship tonnage is multiplied by 4.

2,936

3,851

4,578

4,204

1,187

2,202
2,768

114.8

1.4

1.8

1.3

1.8

2.5

2.3

465.6

369.6

261.1

215.8

168.4

137.2

122.2

−0.9
2.1

111.0

109.2

108.0

102.0

0.9

2.4

1.9

Avg ship
size (tons)

2.8

30,928

23,108

14,747

9,030

6,020

4,069

3,032

2,288

2,448

2,211

1,699

1,383

Carrying
capacity
(000 tons)

2.7

4.2

4.6

3.8

3.6

2.7

2.6

−0.6

0.9

2.4

1.9

Annual compound
growth (%)
(carrying capacity)
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Annual compound
growth (%)

25,663

1860

3,397

22,654

19,174

24,797

88

30

1850

771

2,439

2,211

1,699

1,383

000 tons

Annual compound
growth (%)
all ships (tons)
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21,883

1840

2,168

18,876

1830

3

21,969

34

21,935

1820

2,436

20,253

1810

Number
13,557

000 tons

15,734

Number

All ships

1800

000 tons

Steamships

1790

Number

Sailing ships

Table 11.4 Shipping registered in the United Kingdom, 1790–1900
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marine insurance, which reduced the risks of focusing on a single occupation, while agency and brokerage services provided necessary ancillary
support. Lloyds List, from the 1730s, and a growing plethora of publications, provided information to ship owners on shipping movements,
navigation and stowage (Craig 1982). Helped by these support services,
and drawing upon their evolving expertise, these pioneer owners proved
adept at keeping their vessels actively deployed across a wide range of
trades (Ville 1993). The later subdivision of ship owners into tramp and
liners operators was largely the product of the coming of steam and
the ocean cable. The liners provided a fast, regular, timetabled service of
mixed consignments on particular routes at ﬁxed freight rates. The slower
conveyance of a speciﬁc cargo on almost any route at a negotiated rate
was undertaken by the older tramp vessels. These differences in shipping
operations brought a greater choice of service types for shippers, and
more focused expertise.
The ability of the shipping industry to respond to rapid increases in
demand was further aided by the growing amount of foreign-owned
shipping carrying British trade, a process helped by the repeal of the
Navigation Laws in 1848 which had limited the rights of third-party nations to carry British trade (see chapter 7 above). Jackson has estimated
that by the middle of the nineteenth century about 40 per cent of tonnage entering and clearing ports in Britain’s overseas trade was foreign
owned, leading him to conclude: ‘the myth of the permanent superiority
of the British merchant marine cannot be sustained’ (1988: 260).
The UK shipping industry, as measured by vessels registered, grew
at an average rate of 1.7 per cent between 1790 and 1900 (Table 11.4).
If one takes account of the greater productivity of steamships, growth
rates were around 2.8 per cent. How was this rapid technical change and
growth ﬁnanced? For centuries the industry had relied upon a system of
tenants-in-common ownership of most vessels, which came to be known
as the 64th system, owing to its numerical divisibility. Helped by the
statutory requirement of vessel registration from 1788, which revealed
details of the ship and its owners, the system endured in the nineteenth
century in spite of modern company law and the introduction of limited
liability by the mid-nineteenth century. However, an increasing number
of steamship enterprises opted for joint-stock company status from midcentury (Palmer 1973: 46).
In the light of these streams of organisational and technical change,
it is clear that the speed, regularity and coverage of shipping services all
increased substantially during our period. Freight rates were highly susceptible to short-term ﬂuctuations in the eighteenth century as a result
of intermittent warfare, which increased the demand for shipping in the
form of transport vessels and longer journey times in convoys. The steep
rise in freight rates during the French Wars was particularly noticeable.
However, there appears to have been a large and sustained fall in freight
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rates through the nineteenth century under the impact of the increased
efﬁciencies. North’s (1958: 549) freight rate index for a variety of North
Atlantic cargoes, including timber and grain, shows a fall from an average of 186 in 1816–20 to 77 in 1861–5 (1830 = 100), with the downward
trend continuing through the remainder of the century. An alternative
index by Harley (1988: ﬁg. 11.1) shows a similar downward trend in real
freight rates from about the middle of the nineteenth century (O’Rourke
and Williamson 2000: 36). Finally, an index of coal freight rates shows
a strong secular decline throughout the nineteenth century (Hausman
1993: 611).

Railways
Land transport along a pair of raised rails was used by collieries to ship
coal between pithead and riverside quay in the eighteenth century. Here
gravity transported the cargo the relatively short distance over wooden
rails to the quayside and the wagons were returned uphill by the use of
horses or stationary engines. However, the ‘railway age’ begins in the early
nineteenth century, and particularly from 1830. The construction of the
Liverpool to Manchester railway in that year provided the main features
of a modern railway: a reserved track, public trafﬁc facilities, provision for
passengers, and mechanical power (Gourvish 1988: 57). The line adopted
George Stephenson’s new steam locomotive technology embodied in the
‘Rocket’, which had tested successfully in locomotive trials at Rainhill
in 1829. The line’s success initiated a period of intense railway construction in Britain, with peaks of building activity in 1837–40, 1846–50 and
1860–6, during which a series of main trunk lines were completed and
then complemented by secondary and branch routes. By 1871 about twothirds of the network was completed (see Table 11.5). The resulting pattern was a series of main lines radiating from London to connect with

Figure 11.1
Transport's share of
gross domestic fixed
capital formation in
Great Britain,
1761–1860
Source: Feinstein
1981: 133–4.
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the main cities of the British mainland,
with the latter acting as satellites for reAnnual compound
gional and local lines. An amalgamation
km
growth (%)
movement among the railway companies
1830
157
and the establishment of the Railway
1840
2,390
28.1
Clearing House (1842) helped to address
1850
9,797
13.7
problems of service duplication and the
1860
14,603
3.7
lack of connectedness between lines and
1871
21,558
3.6
1880
25,060
1.4
across schedules.
1890
27,827
1.0
The Liverpool to Manchester was suc1900
30,079
0.7
cessful as a passenger carrier as well as
Annual compound
7.7
for its original use in the cotton trade, an
growth (%)
experience repeated by many subsequent
Source: Mitchell 1975: 316–18.
lines. Passenger travel did not incur the
heavy intercompany transhipment costs
and delays of early freight movements. Moreover, it soon became clear
that the railway could offer long-distance transport to a wider portion of
the population than the stage coach because of the lower marginal costs
of adding additional carriages, or just open trucks for third-class travel.
The railway also became an important mode of information conveyance.
Mail was carried from the time of the Liverpool to Manchester and played
a central role in the success of the Penny Post from 1840 by absorbing
much of the rapid increase in demand as the number of letters delivered
by the Post Ofﬁce grew from 76 million in 1839 to 863 million in 1870
(Daunton 1985: 80, 122–32). In addition, the railway companies played an
important role in the evolution of the telegraph network from the 1830s
to state ownership in 1870, operating services alongside ﬁve specialist
telegraph companies (Perry 1997: 416–17).
Construction of the rail network, as with other transport modes, encountered formidable technical problems. The Liverpool to Manchester
was built across the inhospitable wetlands of Chat Moss. Major construction works such as the Severn Tunnel (1886) and the Forth Bridge (1890),
which survive today, are testimony to the engineering achievements associated with the railway era. Railway companies sought to emphasise the
quality and reputation of their services through the erection of architecturally grandiose stations such as those at London St Pancras and Bristol
Temple Mead. In contrast to the shipping industry with its centuries-old
institutions, railway companies were quick to embrace the new corporate
investment opportunities of the Victorian era to pay for these engineering works and extravagant buildings. Indeed, railway stock was the main
form of traded instrument on the London Stock Exchange, representing
26 per cent of the nominal value of securities quoted in 1863, and rising
further to 49 per cent by 1893 (Michie 1999: 89). Included in these ﬁgures
are the sale of stock in foreign railway companies, particularly those of
the United States, reﬂecting the sector’s role in the growth of British
Table 11.5 Construction of the rail network, 1830–1900
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overseas investment. Railways played an Table 11.6 Growth of railway services, 1842–1900 (millions)
initiating and facilitating role in many
Passengers (numbers)
Freight (tons)
capital market developments. These par1842
24.7
5–6
ticularly included broadening the geo1850
72.9
38
graphical and occupational base of the
1860
153.5
88
investing community through the spread
1870
322.2
167a
of regional stock exchanges, such as at
1880
596.6
232
Liverpool and Manchester (1836) and at 1890
796.3
299
Leeds, Glasgow and Edinburgh (1844–5), 1900
1,114.6
420
together with the sale of much lower Annual compound
6.7
7.6
growth (%)
denominated shares, and the increased
use of ﬁxed-interest industrial securi- Note:
a 1871 figure.
ties to sustain investment when many
Source: Gourvish 1988: 74; Mitchell and Deane 1962: 225–6.
companies were yielding very low dividends (Michie 1999: 60–9, 116–17). The
railway companies themselves were the largest private business organisations of the mid-Victorian period and the pioneers of many advances in
the corporate form, as we shall see below.
Table 11.6 testiﬁes to the very rapid growth of railway trafﬁc, 6.7 per
cent per annum for passenger numbers and 7.6 per cent for freight tons.
The rapid growth in passenger numbers is noteworthy in spite of the
freight motivation for most early railways. Output measured in terms of
numbers of passengers and tons of freight doubled in both the 1850s and
the 1860s.
Railways in Britain did little to extend the transport network already
long established by road, canal and coast. However, their substantial improvements in speed and reductions in cost, particularly for long-distance
bulk carriage were impressive. All writers, contemporary and modern,
agree that railway freight rates considerably undercut road and canal,
and that rail rates fell further between 1830 and 1870. Second-class rail
passenger fares of 2 to 2.5d per mile were well below road rates of similar comfort of 3.5 to 4.5d. Ton-mile canal charges of about 3d were easily
beaten by rail rates of 1.67d. By 1870, passenger rail rates had fallen
40 per cent from these ﬁgures and freight about 30 per cent (Gourvish
1988: 76–7). The cost of conveying mail by rail fell by two-thirds between
1862 and 1882 (Daunton 1985: 133). While rail transport was much faster
than its competitors, the resultant beneﬁts were limited by the relatively
short average journey length of about 20–30 miles (Hawke 1970: 64).

Urban transport
Transport, by its nature, has always been a spatially diverse activity, connecting localities, regions and nations. However, the locus of many transport services lies in a condensed urban environment. The termini of most
transport services have been located in the larger towns and cities of
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Britain, reﬂecting the agglomeration of population and industry, and
therefore transport demand, in these places. Many transport companies
have located their head ofﬁces in towns and cities, to be close to their
major customers. Some towns and cities are themselves intimately connected with the economic activity created by transport, such as Liverpool
and Bristol (shipping) or Crewe and Swindon (railways). Urban expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries additionally created a
demand for localised transport within individual cities and towns. Such
transport was particularly associated with the daily commuting of the
workforce and the distribution of consumer goods from local factories,
wharfs or warehouses to retailers and in some cases direct delivery to the
home.
As Barker has pointed out, urban transport in mid-nineteenth-century
Britain predominantly drew upon human and animal power (1988: 134).
Costers, porters, hawkers and general dock labour all provided substantial amounts of freight carriage. The number of horses pulling freight
vehicles grew rapidly in the nineteenth century and much of this was
urban activity (Thompson 1976: 80). Cartage agents like Pickfords found
plenty of work transporting goods to and from the new urban rail termini. Passenger transport took many forms, from hackney coaches for the
wealthy to cabriolets (cabs) for hire and short-distance stage coaches, the
latter being replaced by the more practical omnibus from the 1830s. In
spite of some improvements to the efﬁciency of the omnibus through better design, horse tramways began to spread in the 1870s, the reduced friction of their metal rail yielding a signiﬁcant saving on horse costs. They
were particularly popular in provincial cities such as Glasgow, Edinburgh,
Birmingham and Liverpool, whose urban spread was insufﬁcient to justify the heavier investments in underground railways begun in London
in 1863 with the building of the Metropolitan Railway. Inanimate forms
of urban road transport developed towards the end of the nineteenth
century: steam trams from about the 1890s and electric from around
1900.

COMPETITION AND INDUSTRY POLICY
The transport sector has always attracted considerable government attention, and there was no exception to this rule in the period under study
in spite of a generally limited role for government in the economy. Thus,
for example, road, waterway and railway projects required parliamentary
approval. Shipping was subject to a series of statutes, dealing with such
issues as ports, registration, safety, manning and trading rights. Doubtless, much of this attention reﬂected the strategic and defence role of
transport, especially shipping. Transport investment reverberated widely
through the economy, with the result that governments also sought to
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inﬂuence its domestic impact. Several economic concepts help to clarify
these political and legal dimensions, most notably natural monopoly and
public goods.
Under natural monopoly it is always cheaper for a single ﬁrm to produce the relevant output than two or more ﬁrms. This applies to transport
because large economies of scale and high minimum levels of operation
exist in most transport service industries. Public goods are those which
are open to all users, and in which one person’s consumption does not
prevent another’s. To a degree, this is true of transport services; rail, road
and waterway may be used by many consumers simultaneously as long
as there remains some unused capacity.
The existence of monopoly and public-good features in transport
commonly attracts government intervention to address the injustices of
anti-competitive behaviour and the market failure represented by the underprovision of services. Monopolists have the power to raise prices and
restrict output, both of which are likely to limit the economic beneﬁts
of a transport system to a small group of operators. On the other hand,
public goods risk being underprovided for the opposite reason: the beneﬁts are too widely dispersed (that is, social utility exceeds private utility),
so that the private costs exceed the beneﬁts to the transport company. In
practice, as we shall see, transport is not a pure form of natural monopoly
or public good, but rather a complex hybrid of both features. Finally, issues of co-ordination and standardisation, critical for a complex network
industry, are often not easily handled without some form of intervention.
Therefore, governments must decide how the costs and beneﬁts of
improved transport systems are to be distributed among different interest groups. Three direct interests are the providers of infrastructure,
transport service operators (carriers) and service users (passengers, merchandise owners). Vertical integration, for example the ownership by oil
companies of tanker ﬂeets, helps to reconcile these groups but also extends market power. Indirect beneﬁts from transport investment (known
to economists as positive externalities) ﬂow more widely through society,
and thus reinforce ofﬁcial interest in the industry.
Road maintenance before the turnpike trusts illustrates an undersupplied public good, since the costs were borne locally and collectively
within the parish but the beneﬁciaries were largely private, including
through-travellers from beyond the locality. The introduction of turnpike trusts privatised road use and transferred much of its cost to the
user. By mitigating the risks of underinvestment associated with public
goods, this change provided a ﬁrm basis for higher optimal standards of
road maintenance and held out the prospect of the construction of new
highways through the support of an income stream from toll charges.
The trusts themselves were non-proﬁt bodies in contrast to the for-proﬁt
joint-stock companies adopted by canal builders and, later, railway companies. They were initially viewed as supplementing local labour services
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in road maintenance and thus a more limited role was envisaged than
the major new capital expenditures of canal and railway construction.
While providing a solution to underinvestment in roads, the new policy adversely affected local groups who were accustomed to traditional
free right of access. They perceived the change, sometimes negatively, as
the replacement of a communal institution based on custom and tradition with a cash payment based on a private market transaction (Albert
1983: 36). Popular unrest occurred among colliers and industrial workers
in the West Country, Wales and the West Riding of Yorks, sometimes ending in the destruction or avoidance of tollgates and assaults on collectors
(Albert 1983: 35; O’Brien 1994: 219). Opposition gradually subsided when
the beneﬁcial impact was more clearly understood and concessions were
obtained for local users.
A system of tolls existed on many inland waterways before 1750,
charged by empowered local trustees or commissioners, sometimes as
part of a tradition of river conservancy and often under the inﬂuence of
town corporations. Such groups did not always serve the best interests of
users, continuing levies after improvement costs had been paid and mixing waterway ﬁnances with other local services (Duckham 1983: 113–14).
In the canal era the joint-stock company was the main instrument of
progress, with its more clearly deﬁned rights and responsibilities to serve
only an individual waterway, and its ability to raise sufﬁcient funds for
the high cost of building new waterways. This lack of a challenge to customary public usage of rivers, and the fact that canals extended transport
into new areas, minimised the opposition to their development, although
of course there were still some losers from trade diversion.
Distributional questions largely centred on the vertical integration of
canal owner and barge operator. As noted above, several of the earliest
canals were built by individual entrepreneurs for their own use. Parliament used its control over the passage of the Canal Acts to insist, in most
cases, upon a separation of ownership of the canal from the carriage of
goods upon it until an act of 1845 reversed this policy. Bridgewater was
one of a few permitted exceptions to this policy; others included the
Forth and Clyde and the Thames and Severn (Hawke 1970: 232; Duckham
1983: 124). Given the growing investor interest in canal building by the
late eighteenth century, the separation of owners from operators did not
extinguish the growth of the canal system. Integration of operator and
user was not uncommon, for example coal merchants and ﬂour millers
who owned their own barges. The largest operators were non-integrated
specialists, although they gained alternative market power by operating
across several transport modes, the most famous being Pickfords, with
a very strong presence on both British roads and waterways (Turnbull
1979).
While the separation of functions enhanced competition, transport infrastructure remained a monopoly that governments sought to control
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in ways that balanced the private incentive to extend the network with
the broader social welfare gain from lower transport costs. The canal’s
enabling act included a schedule of maximum tolls. In some cases, legal
restrictions on canal company dividends were imposed but such a policy
was at best intermittent and piecemeal (Duckham 1983: 114). Competition
was also aided by the growing variety of investors in canal companies,
particularly merchants, bankers and landowners, whose interests might
favour lower transport costs or improved land values in the vicinity. Thus,
they had an incentive for improved transport services rather than solely
seeking to maximise the private returns to the canal company. The average return on capital in canal companies in 1825 has been estimated as
5.75 per cent, suggesting that a competitive equilibrium perhaps existed
(Duckham 1983: 123).
Navigational aids for shipping such as buoys and the dredging of deepwater entrance channels were public goods, paid for by a levy on shipping
entering and clearing the port. Some infrastructure such as lighthouses
was also erected in the interests of passing shipping; this was handled
by a national system of shipping dues to avoid non-payment (free-riding)
by some ship owners. National ports policy by the sixteenth century had
begun to divide all of the coastline into the jurisdiction of a series of
legally deﬁned ports, each covering its locality in order to strengthen
revenue-raising capabilities (customs duties, shipping and port dues) and
to eliminate free-riding by trading at small inlets. By mitigating the risks
of an undersupply of public goods, ofﬁcial policy ensured the increased
safety and productivity of shipping.
Port infrastructure was becoming far more capital intensive by the
early nineteenth century, initially to handle the rising volume of trafﬁc
and to safeguard valuable cargoes being warehoused, but by mid-century
to serve the needs of large steamships for deep-water berths and rapid
turnaround. By 1840, Liverpool boasted nearly 70 acres of dock estate,
stretching 21/2 miles along the Mersey, and receiving 2.5 million tons
of shipping (Hyde 1971: 247). These new investments required modern
forms of capital raising and organisation, focused on a dock’s particular
needs rather than taking the general form of a public good. The resulting
private dock companies charged dock fees to shipping ﬁrms using their
facilities. In some ports, such as Hull, this produced monopolists who
devoted resources to protecting their dominance at the expense of investing in new facilities (Jackson 1988: 228). Contrariwise, in a large port
like London, their very high ﬁxed and low marginal costs created destructive price competition among numerous dock companies. Amalgamations
were the initial solution, such as that of the London, St Katherine’s and
Victoria Dock companies on the Thames in 1864. New investments and
price wars continued until a Royal Commission led to the establishment
of the Port of London Authority in 1909 to take over the private dock companies and operate again in the public interest (Jackson 1988: 228, 241).
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Shipping operated in an increasingly competitive market, which helps
explain the ability of the industry to respond effectively to steep increases in demand. The monopoly charters of the overseas trading companies (East India Company, Hudson’s Bay Company and others) had been
revoked by the early nineteenth century. Under the inﬂuence of the
changing political economy, British governments believed that national
economic and strategic interests were better served by encouraging a general proliferation of ship owners and merchants rather than placing their
faith in a few vertically integrated monopolies. The costs of setting up
political and economic connections to many parts of the world had now
been absorbed by these original companies in return for their monopoly
rents. The other remnants of mercantilism, which had included the exclusion of third-country shipping from British trade, were relaxed in the
1820s and ﬁnally abolished in 1848 (see chapter 7). Coasting, however,
continued to be reserved for British shipping for reasons of defence and
because navigating treacherous coastal waters and handling bulk cargoes bred sturdy seaman: a policy known as the ‘nursery of seamen’. Low
entry and exit costs in shipping and a fragmented ownership structure
enhanced competition. Michael Henley and Son, one of the largest ship
owning ﬁrms operating out of London at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, entered the industry through the purchase of cheap second-hand
sailing vessels. Their ﬂeet of up to twenty vessels represented only a tiny
share of London registered shipping (Ville 1987).
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the structure of the
industry began to change owing to the new technologies of steam and
steel. This generated vessels that were more expensive by dint of their
steam power and that could be built much larger, because of the use
of steel, to produce scale economies. Thus increased capital indivisibility
(larger ships) and intensity (capital substituted for labour) raised entry
costs to the industry. The regularity of steam, and improved international
communications from the development of the oceanic cable, meant that
for the ﬁrst time regular timetabled shipping services could be offered,
but this required a ﬂeet of vessels to operate. As a result of these changed
operating conditions, a few large companies emerged as leaders of the
British shipping industry. However, speed and regularity are more important sources of competitive advantage for some commodities than others.
In the carriage of bulk raw materials such as coal and metallic ores, staples of the demand for shipping, cost is a more important factor. With
rapid technical change in shipbuilding and consequentially equally high
rates of obsolescence, some ship owners concentrated on the purchase
and operation on demand of second-hand steamers at lower cost. The effect was to divide much of the shipping industry into liner (fast, regular,
high-quality) and tramp (slow, irregular, low-cost) shipping services. This
segmentation encouraged relatively high degrees of competition, to the
extent that groups of liner companies began to form collusive shipping
rings from the 1870s in an attempt to exclude the price-cutting tramps
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from particular trades. It was not until the beginning of the twentieth
century, however, that British governments addressed seriously this restraint on competition.
The broad social beneﬁts from railways and the strong monopoly features of the network have been compelling reasons for relatively high
levels of government interest. High entry costs were associated with the
construction challenges discussed earlier. In addition, acquiring privately
owned land could be an obstacle. Therefore, a private act of parliament
provided for the legal devices of compulsory land purchase (eminent domain) and the security of limited liability in order to attract a broader
range of investors (see chapter 8 above). From the outset, many of the
largest investors were business owners who stood to gain directly from
improved transport services. This helped to mitigate the risk that the
beneﬁts would largely be secured by the railway company rather than
service users and the broader community. Competition among railway
companies and the initial separation of infrastructure owners from service operators also lessened the threat to competition.
From about the 1840s the competitive structure of the industry began to change. Amalgamations produced larger railway companies with
fewer rivals. The acquisition of competing canal companies had a similar effect. Competition from new entrants was lessened by the rising
scale economies that were being recognised and acted upon. It soon became apparent that the turnpike model of separate infrastructure owners
and freight carriers was unworkable, both technically, because of safety
considerations, and economically because of the monopoly power of the
former. Governments unwittingly contributed to the trend by deciding
in 1840 to prohibit private operators on a line, thus fostering vertical
integration in the industry. A ‘railway interest’ emerged in parliament,
initially to support the passage of railway acts against opposition from
landlords who feared their land values would be affected and road operators who anticipated a loss of business. Increasingly, though, the interest
became vociferous in support of powerful economic rights for the railways (Alderman 1973). Similarly, the growth of managerial capitalism
among the railway companies created an executive class that performed
to the best interests of the company, rather than the business interests
of some of its shareholders (Gourvish 1973). Thus, by 1850 the top ﬁfteen
railway companies controlled 61 per cent of total paid-up capital in the
industry, rising to 80 per cent two decades later (Gourvish 1988: 83).
Governments took seriously the threat to competition posed by these
developments and were pressured by traders organised in chambers of
commerce and also well-represented in parliament to oppose the railway
interest. However, the idea that politics is dominated by distributional
coalitions of producer group interests is not the only explanation of government regulation of the railways. A strong sense of public interest motivated Gladstone at the Board of Trade during the passage of the 1844
Railway Act. Among contemporaries, he showed a close understanding

313

0521820367c11.xml

314

CU1021B-Floud/Johnson

July 23, 2003

16:46

Simon Ville

of the operation of natural monopolies and the collusive tendencies of
oligopolists. The act was an important piece of legislation that has been
neglected by many economic historians in the belief that it became watered down during parliamentary debates. It established a pattern of price
and quantity regulation that survived until 1960, and its safety provisions
remain today. It has been viewed as shaping the pattern for regulation of
natural monopolies in the United States through the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, which itself was the basis for subsequent legislation (McLean
and Foster 1992: 315). The act included an option for nationalisation of
the rail system, which was to come into effect after twenty-one years. In
practice, these purchase powers were not taken up. However, McLean and
Foster (1992: 322) have argued for a behavioural impact: that the threat of
appropriation inﬂuenced investors and managers to keep rates of return
below 10 per cent by investing in less productive branch and secondary
lines. Thus, the experience of Britain’s railways over the next eighty years
might be viewed as evidence of the hypothesis that regulated industries
produce overcapitalisation (Averch and Johnson 1962).
More effective, though, was the scope for intervention in the amalgamation movement. To commence working together, companies had to
seek parliamentary approval. This gave parliament the right to investigate
their practices, and the Board of Trade in particular negotiated with the
railways the ﬁnal terms of the amending act. By the 1850s, parliament
was looking sceptically at many of the proposed amalgamations. The division of interests between users and railway companies was made clear
by mid-century with the debates over discriminatory pricing. Under the
terms of the Railway and Canal Trafﬁc Act of 1854, companies were only
permitted to price discriminate on the basis of cost, whereas their major
motive would have been the degree of competition, charging less where
competition from shipping was signiﬁcant. It is conceivable that some
of this anti-monopoly stance was overzealous; several proposed amalgamations of the 1870s that sought to cut costs during a downturn were
rejected. Signiﬁcantly, Irving has attributed the declining performance
of railway companies in the late nineteenth century in part to service
extensions and improvements required by parliament (Irving 1978). Assessing government policy towards the railway as a whole, Dobbin (1994)
has concluded that it had a formative inﬂuence on the shift of British
industry policy away from the idealised free markets of laissez-faire to a
form of interventionism designed to mitigate an excessive concentration
of economic power.

NEW ORGANISATIONAL C HALLENGES
We have seen in the previous sections that in order to be competitive
transport ﬁrms often have to operate at a high level of output, employing
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large amounts of geographically dispersed capital and labour. Firm-level
evidence of this is not hard to ﬁnd. Much of the growth of road transport
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was concentrated upon a
limited number of operators, agglomerating sizeable road ﬂeets along
major trade routes. Gerhold has identiﬁed one Frome carrier operating
a weekly ‘team’ to London of ﬁve wagons pulled by thirty-nine horses
(Barker and Gerhold 1993: 21). Thomas Russell and Company, operating
between Exeter and London together with regional services in the early
nineteenth century, used about 200 horses and thirty wagons, employed
sixty to seventy staff and had premises in each town on the route. These in
turn were dwarfed by Pickfords of Manchester with 400 wagons by 1803,
and Deacon and Co, serving Yorkshire and Norwich, who were reported to
operate with 700 horses, 400 employees and 100 branches by 1838 (Barker
and Gerhold 1993: 23).
Since most canal companies were not permitted to act as common
carriers before 1845 there were few very large infrastructure enterprises,
with typically no more than ﬁfty staff. As with road transport, it was
the carrier, lacking a monopoly but with the ability to operate across
a wide area, that had the freedom to expand. It was noted earlier that
much vertical integration existed between carriers and users of the canal
network. However, the largest ﬁrms were specialist carriers. Chief among
them was again Pickfords, whose services spanned much of England from
Liverpool and Bristol in the west to Leicester and London in the east,
covered by a ﬂeet which grew from ten canal boats in 1795 to 116 in 1838
(Turnbull 1979: ch. 5).
Shipping generated some very large enterprises, particularly from the
mid-nineteenth century with the growth of the major liner companies
which exploited huge operational scale economies in the provision of fast
timetabled services over major trade-routes. Sometimes, through the aid
of government mail subventions, these companies expanded into longhaul trades, including Cunard in the transatlantic trade, Royal Mail in
South America, P&O to India and the east, and Elder Dempster to West
Africa. By the end of the nineteenth century the ‘big 5’ of P&O, Royal
Mail, Cunard, Ellerman and Furness Withy led the British shipping industry (Boyce 1995). In most cases these ﬁrms were not heavily vertically
integrated; it was the geographical breadth of their shipping operations,
rather than their range of functions, that distinguished them. Some established overseas ofﬁces if they traded very regularly with a particular
port. In most cases, however, the frequency of their transactions at any
port was insufﬁcient to justify setting up a local ofﬁce, with the additional ﬁxed costs and risks involved. Instead, the agency system was commonly adopted whereby ship owners paid local ﬁrms, often specialising
in agency and brokerage work, to handle their needs such as the payment
of bills, the receipt and delivery of merchandise, and the organisation of
victualling and ship repairs.
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The railway companies were the true giants among transport enterprise as enormous consumers of ﬁxed capital for construction (bridges,
tunnels and stations) and operation (rolling stock). Since the railway system expanded at a time of increasing resort to incorporation among
Britain’s larger listed ﬁrms, this enables size comparisons to be drawn
across sectors. By 1850 all of the largest ﬁrms listed on the Stock Exchange
in Britain were railway companies. Indeed, the top ﬁfteen companies accounted for 62 per cent of total paid-up capital in the UK, thus dwarfing manufacturing industry (Gourvish 1988: 83). The London and North
Western Railway (LNWR) had raised more than £29 million by 1851, employed a workforce of 12,000, and operated 800 miles of track (Kirby 1994:
130). This was a giant scale of operations for the time and these ﬁgures
would have still outstripped most British manufacturers half a century
later (Wardley 1999: 102–3). The high degree of co-ordination and interaction required to manage these resources and operate a fast and frequent
but safe service favoured the adoption of a single governance structure
rather than transacting with other ﬁrms. Similarly, these companies had
reached output levels where many highly repetitive transactions were
most cheaply performed within the company. In other words, railway
companies sought to minimise their transactions costs by internalising
most activities.
The size and spatial diversity of transport enterprises brought unprecedented organisational challenges yet to be faced in other sectors. These
particularly involved the logistical management of large volumes of capital and a sizeable workforce spread over an extensive area, yet requiring
very high levels of co-ordination and control for reasons of efﬁciency
and safety. Size and spread of activities worsened problems of workforce
control, particularly the risk of unobserved opportunist behaviour from
employees. In addition, the fact that transport is a service industry created additional management challenges. Services are non-storable – they
are produced at a particular time and place and must be consumed there
and then or not at all, leading to the risk of underutilisation. Moreover,
demand for transport services varies greatly on a monthly, daily or even
hourly basis. Transport ﬁrms therefore require managers well skilled in
matching a relatively inelastic supply with highly elastic demand. How
effectively did they respond to these new challenges?
The challenges were of limited signiﬁcance for the emerging road and
canal network. Most ﬁrms were small and localised, helped by the fact
that management was generally divided into separate owner and operator
ﬁrms. However, the leading transport operators, such as Pickfords, had
relatively large and spatially dispersed workforces requiring careful monitoring and detailed transport planning. They tackled these challenges in
a number of ways. The natural co-ordination yielded by their fast and regular transport services provided them with good up-to-date information
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about their enterprise. Pickfords spread their management across three
regional centres, Manchester, Leicester and London, and linked these with
intermediate depots and agencies along the major routes and with their
own local manager. Ownership of ofﬁces along the route reduced the
distance between different outposts of the ﬁrm. At the senior strategic
level, decision-making was shared across a series of partners and, when
the ﬁrm came close to collapse in 1817, new partners entered the ﬁrm
with trust-building kinship ties and connections to strong ﬁnancial networks (Turnbull 1979: 36–41).
Shipping companies were far more geographically distended, and developed a range of strategies. Internal subcontracting was widely practised. This was also a popular strategy among early factory owners and
involved delegating some labour recruitment and management tasks to
senior employees. In this case, the appointment of the ship’s master was
one of the key decisions for a ﬁrm; upon him fell the responsibility for
hiring his crew, keeping a set of onboard accounts, and conducting business with shipping agents and merchants in foreign ports. Owners relied
heavily upon masters’ regular correspondence back to the company on
trade conditions and the performance of the crew. The threat to withhold
monthly payments to seamen’s families back in England exerted a powerful form of social control over these distant workforces. The ship owner
rewarded his masters with higher pay rates, regular employment and
sometimes a share in ownership. The owner also dealt directly with shipping agents through correspondence, and often built up close long-term
business bonds through reciprocity (Ville 1981). Ship owners also drew
upon the services of ship brokers who served as specialist intermediaries
in the freight market. Shipping ﬁrms also beneﬁted from co-operation
with one another (Boyce 1995). The growth of public trading information in the eighteenth century gave the ship owner a further means of
assessing the performance of his masters as well as benchmarking the
performance of different vessels in his ﬂeet against each other.
The earliest railway enterprises drew upon the experience of canal and
shipping companies. The Stockton and Darlington subcontracted major
functions such as rolling stock repairs and track maintenance to other
companies (Kirby 1993). However, the growth of longer-distance rail lines
and company amalgamations from the 1840s required a quite different
response: the internalisation of most activities and the modernisation
of corporate management. Railway companies were pioneers of modern
business organisation, separating ownership from management to create a professional executive class organised into a systematically conceived managerial structure for the company. This idea of ‘managerial
capitalism’ was generally slower to develop in Britain than other comparable nations such as the United States and Germany, but it was notable
amongst the railway companies from an early stage. The companies were
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generally organised into functional departments staffed by professional
managers with particular expertise in areas such as engineering, ﬁnance,
legal matters and trafﬁc operations, enabling them to handle more effectively such issues as safety and maintenance, and matching trafﬁc ﬂows
to demand estimates. Mobile and capable professional executives with experience across ﬁrms and industries dominated the senior management
of Britain’s railways by the late nineteenth century; 56 per cent of their
chief executive appointments (1890–1909) had worked for at least three
other companies (Channon 1988; Hughes 1992).
The separation of ownership from management, a key tenet of the
modern business enterprise, solved some problems but created others. A
separate managerial class creates a divergence of interests between owner
and manager. The risk exists that the manager may use his superior information of some of the day-to-day operations of the ﬁrm in an opportunist
manner, for example putting private business interests or career promotion ahead of what is best for the company. While this corporate governance problem still exists today, it was particularly serious during this
transitionary stage between personal and managerial capitalism because
ﬁrms had not yet learned ways of exerting closer control over their executives. Moreover, many railway managers had not made the full transition to being professional executives. They maintained personal business
interests, often connected to the railway industry where their expertise
lay, thereby creating a potential conﬂict of interest between their professional duties and their private business ventures. An example of this
occurred in the 1850s when Daniel Gooch, a manager with the Great Western Railway (GWR), acquired a coal company, Ruabon, along with some
fellow employees. The Ruabon became a major coal supplier to the railway
under a ten-year contract. A suit against Gooch in the Court of Chancery,
alleging undue preference, was unsuccessful, but there remained concern about an employee proﬁting personally from supply contracts to
the company (Channon 1999).
Transport enterprises developed accounting techniques as a management aid. The capital intensity and indivisibility of many major investment items necessitated careful attention to the methods of capital
accounting. Financial accounting would aid the assessment and monitoring of geographically distant parts of the enterprise. Arnold (1995)
and McLean (1995) have shown how nineteenth-century shipping ﬁrms
instituted and adopted modern accounting techniques to meet the organisational challenges faced by the industry, but it was the railway companies that made most particular use of accounting techniques. Legislation
of the 1840s required railway companies to keep detailed accounts and
have them audited half-yearly. Mark Huish of the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) went much further than this by collecting a variety of
operating statistics as a tool for managing costs and raising the capacity
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utilisation of its services. The importance of railway accountants can be
illustrated by the fact that the companies employed as many accountants
and cashiers as they did engineers, and that the industry was of central importance in the expansion of many successful accountancy ﬁrms,
including Deloitte’s and Waterhouse (Gourvish 1988: 71).
A key part of the new management techniques of the railway companies was their pioneering role in the development of internal labour
markets. The companies employed some of the largest and most geographically dispersed workforces of nineteenth-century industry. Internalisation sought to maintain the same employees as long-term members of
the company, enabling them to draw on their large workforce to ﬁll positions as they arose. This mitigated many of the costs and uncertainties
of labour recruitment, while additionally increasing the company’s control over its employees and the work process when compared with either
an external labour market or internal subcontracting. Howlett (2000) has
shown how the Great Eastern Railway used promotion ladders and seniority wage payments to retain their workforce. Non-wage welfare beneﬁts
were used for the same purpose (Kingsford 1970).

A S S E S S M E N T O F E C O N O M I C I M PA C T
The question of transport’s impact on the economy has produced an
extensive historical and conceptual literature, and in the process generated two of the most interesting but controversial historical methodologies, the Rostowian leading sector thesis and the counterfactual social
savings calculation. There seems little doubt that the sequential waves of
transport innovations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did
have an important impact; our challenge is to provide a balanced evaluation of their effects and how these were distributed. In this chapter
we have distinguished between direct beneﬁts (or costs) of transport investment to the parties to the contract (owners, operators and users) and
the indirect or unintended impact on third parties. The latter are often
referred to as externalities or secondary effects. In transport studies, the
secondary effects are often more substantial than the direct impact. For
example, the negative transport externality of pollution and the positive
externality of lower prices can ﬂow widely through the economy.

Rostow and Szostak as transport advocates
Earlier sections of this chapter have highlighted the major developments
in each transport mode over our period and summarised the improvements to transport provision that resulted. This involved a mix of reduced
freight rates, faster speeds, greater regularity and broader geographic
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coverage. As previously noted, the effects can be so broad ranging that it
is difﬁcult to measure them accurately, particularly for earlier historical
periods where our evidence is far from complete. The work of Szostak
(1991), however, provides us with at least some conceptual guidelines for
evaluating the impact.
Szostak sought to explain why an industrial revolution occurred in
England in the late eighteenth century by reference to road and waterway
improvements, and used France as a control experiment: a less effective
inland transport system here prevented or delayed industrial modernisation. He detailed improvements to the system of inland transport and
their effects in a complex ﬂow diagram (Szostak 1991: 29). By widening
markets, improving access to raw materials, introducing new distribution
methods and reducing inventory stocks, transport improvements fostered
the main features of the industrial revolution, namely regional specialisation, increased scale of production and the introduction of new industries. These three features, in turn, created more favourable conditions
for an increase in the rate of technological innovation.
A shortcoming of Szostak’s analysis is the extent to which it draws
upon a view of a British ‘industrial revolution’ at the end of the eighteenth century that is no longer widely accepted. An alternative longerterm process of industrialisation, which characterises British experience
as well as that of other European nations, leaves the Szostak model as
telling only the beginning of a much longer story. His model might aptly
be applied to the railway age where the new technologies of steam and
metal sustained the earlier progress; or to ocean shipping with its inﬂuence on the early stages of globalisation. His conceptual framework will
help guide our discussion later in this section.
An alternative perspective was provided by Rostow (1960), who argued
that modern economic development was driven by a ‘leading sector’,
which experienced very rapid growth as a result of technological innovation. This leading sector ignited a ‘take-off’ in economic development through the stimulus that it imparted to the macroeconomy, and
speciﬁcally through its linkages or ‘spreading effects’ to related industries. Rostow sought to place the railway centrally within his schema of
economic development by arguing that it was ‘historically the most powerful single initiator of take-offs’ (Rostow 1960: 302). His work has been
subject to critical analysis; as with Szostak, particular criticism has focused upon his interpretation of the pattern of economic development as
a revolutionary change. Again, however, the methodology and nomenclature he developed have survived as valuable tools and will help to guide
our analysis in this section.
We begin with an examination of the likely economy-wide impact of
transport through its share of national aggregates such as investment,
productivity and earnings. Thereafter, we look at more speciﬁc aspects of
its role: its social overhead capital features; its linkages and spillovers to
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particular industries and sectors; its impact on market integration; and
ﬁnally the extent of social savings yielded by transport innovations.

Capital formation
Feinstein has estimated the size and distribution of gross domestic ﬁxed
capital formation for the century to 1860, disaggregated by broad sectors: agriculture; industry and trade; transport; and residential and social.
Transport’s share ﬂuctuates between 15 and 21 per cent before 1840, the
peak coming in the 1790s with the boom in canal construction and the
increased demand for shipping tonnage during the French Wars. Transport’s share then begins to rise in the 1830s with the beginning of railway
construction and peaks in the 1840s at 39 per cent with the rapid expansion of the rail network. Feinstein notes that a similar magnitude fall
in residential and social (especially housing) occurred in those ﬁnal two
decades of our period but is uncertain whether railway investment occurred at the expense of social capital (Feinstein 1981: 133–4; Feinstein
and Pollard 1988: 444). His ﬁgures are decennial averages. A more disaggregated approach reveals that transport investment was highly cyclical
from year to year, as indicated by the canal and road building manias
in the mid-1790s and the railway surges in the late 1840s. In the latter
case, railway investment may have constituted as much as a half of gross
domestic ﬁxed capital formation (Gourvish 1988: 60–1).
The large and highly cyclical nature of transport investment raises
questions about its impact upon capital and factor product markets. In
particular, is there evidence of crowding out in capital or factor markets,
possibly resulting in sub-optimal resource allocation? Since the funds for
capital hungry transport projects were often raised during periods of optimism in the hope of future growth in transport demand, did this restrict
the opportunities for developing other new industries with important
growth potential? Contemporary opinion viewed transport projects as a
panacea for economic backwardness, which may have skewed investment.
However, it should be remembered that there is a much larger supply of
investible funds available during boom periods owing to optimism and
higher income levels. Moreover, as we saw earlier, transport played an
important role in capital market innovations, which helped to attract
additional sources of ﬁnance. This growth in capital markets is reﬂected
in a rising investment ratio into double ﬁgures during the railway age
(Gourvish 1988: 62). Major transport projects requiring parliamentary approval were characterised by a long gestation period from original planning to completion. Thus, projects planned and ﬁnanced at the top of
economic cycles often generated a demand for labour and other production factors during subsequent downturns, providing in some cases a
much needed contra-cyclical stimulus to the economy. The second half
of the 1840s is a case in point, as we shall see below.
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Table 11.7 Productivity growth in transport by mode (cent per annum)

Annual compound growth (%)

Roads

Per Canals

Shipping

Railways

0.7

0.8

1.4

2.2

(1690–1840)

(1780–1830)

(1780–1860)

(1830–60)

Sources: Roads, Gerhold 1996: 511; canals, McCloskey 1981: 125; shipping, McCloskey 1981: 125; Harley 1993:
199–200; railways, McCloskey 1981: 125.

Productivity
What evidence do we have for productivity growth in transport that may
have mitigated the risks of crowding out by using a ﬁxed amount of
resources more efﬁciently? Many of the sources of productivity growth
have been identiﬁed in the earlier sections of this chapter. They included
better roads, vehicles and horse breeds. On inland waterways this meant
better navigation by way of canal and the development of ﬂying services. Shipping beneﬁted from organisational improvements associated
with specialist ship owning such as better stowage and navigation, and
from rapid technological changes, particularly the shifts to metal and
steam. Railways were still in their relative infancy by 1860 but rationalisation through amalgamation and the operation of the clearing house
was already impacting upon productivity. As we have also seen on pp.
000–00 above, these improvements were reﬂected in falling freight rates,
and faster and more regular journeys. Calculating productivity change
provides us with a single statistic, reported in Table 11.7 which captures
most of these varied improvements.
McCloskey evaluated the size and importance of productivity improvements in some of the key ‘modernised’ sectors of the British economy,
1780–1860. He calculated this by multiplying a sector’s annual productivity growth by the weighting of its output in the economy. This led
to the result that transport’s contribution was the largest among the
‘modernised’ sectors, that is, 0.23 per cent per annum of the modernised
sectors’ total growth of 0.52 per cent. McCloskey concluded that ‘transportation was therefore among the more notably progressive parts of the
economy’ (McCloskey 1981: 114; 1994: 252). Table 11.8 reports McCloskey’s
estimates, and also Harley’s (1993) downwards revision of McCloskey’s
calculations for the modernised sectors. The contribution of shipping
is drastically reduced, from 0.14 to 0.03 per cent, by substituting Harley’s
own productivity growth estimates while retaining the same weightings.
Transport’s share (0.12) is now slightly behind that of cotton, although the
modernised sectors’ contribution to national performance is now greater
as a result of using Crafts’ more recent and more conservative calculations for total productivity growth. Harley’s ﬁgures are an improvement
in that they take some account of productivity in the coastal trade, but
his location of productivity improvements in technological changes in
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Table 11.8 Sectoral contributions to productivity: annual percentage growth, 1780–1860
McCloskey estimates

Harley estimates

Ville estimates

Share

Productivity

Contribution

Productivity

Contribution

Productivity

Cotton

0.070

2.6

0.18

1.9

0.13

1.9

0.13

Worsteds

0.035

1.8

0.06

1.3

0.05

1.3

0.05

Woollens

0.035

0.9

0.03

0.6

0.02

0.6

0.02

Iron

0.020

0.9

0.02

0.9

0.02

0.9

0.02

Canals and railways

0.070

1.3

0.09

1.3

0.09

1.3

0.09

Shipping

0.060

2.3

0.14

0.5

0.03

1.4

0.08

Roads

0.040

Sum of modernised sectors

0.330

1.8

0.52

1.2

Agriculture

0.270

0.4

0.12

All others

0.850

0.6

0.55

Total

1.450

1.19

Contribution

0.7

0.03

0.34

1.3

0.42

0.7

0.19

0.7

0.19

0.02

0.02
0.55

Note: Estimates of roads’ share based on evidence in Gerhold 1996: 497–8.
Sources: McCloskey 1981: 114; Harley 1993: 199–200; Table 11.7 above.

the later nineteenth century may understate earlier advances in organisation and infrastructure. Therefore, we offer a middle point between
the work of McCloskey and Harley as a ﬁgure for shipping productivity
growth. The substantial improvements in road services before the midnineteenth century have now been estimated by Gerhold (1996: 511) and
can be included. As a result, total productivity growth in agriculture and
the ‘modernised sectors’ aggregates to a ﬁgure (0.61 per cent per annum)
that is larger than Crafts’s (1985: 86; 1987a: 250) aggregate national estimates (0.55 per cent per annum). Harley’s lower estimate for transport
productivity, when aggregated with the other modernised sectors and
agriculture (0.53 per cent per annum), is almost equivalent to the Crafts
national ﬁgure. This suggests either that all productivity growth in the
British economy was conﬁned to the sectors indicated in Table 11.8, or
that Crafts’s widely recognised downward revisions of national productivity growth for this period are too conservative.
Gemmell and Wardley (1990: 307) have calculated that by 1856 (and
through to 1913), ‘productivity levels in . . . transport services would appear to have been high relative to manufacturing’. Besides lending some
credence to the idea of productivity growth in the sector over the previous
century and a half, this additionally suggests that heavy investments in
transport were unlikely to have starved more productive sectors of scarce
resources.

Earnings
How important were the transport industries as a source of earnings
and proﬁts in the British economy? Information on proﬁts is sketchy and
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there is no compelling evidence for consistently high proﬁts in transport
industries. Government intervention, or just the threat of it, may have
prevented widespread or persistent monopoly proﬁts, thereby helping to
achieve a more efﬁcient allocation of the beneﬁts of new transport systems. It was noted above that the proﬁtability of inland waterways was
not exceptional. Davis (1957) doubted whether ship owners achieved outstanding returns in the early eighteenth century, although subsequent periods of war, especially the French Wars, provided exceptional temporary
returns to the industry owing to the increased demand for large numbers
of transport ships (Ville 1987). The earnings of shipping companies made
an important contribution to Britain’s trade balance by the boost they
provided to invisible earnings. Britain’s invisible trade grew more rapidly
than its visible trade in the eighteenth century as local ship owners took
over much of the international carrying trade from the Dutch (Thomas
1981: 92). Some of the earliest railways, such as the Liverpool to Manchester, achieved good returns, though many later ones, especially regional
and branch lines, performed poorly (Donaghy 1965–6). The signiﬁcance
of transport earnings lies perhaps in speciﬁc regions and aspects of the
economy rather than in national aggregates. Port hinterlands, such as
around Liverpool, Glasgow and Bristol, beneﬁted from substantial reinvestment of mercantile proﬁts into evolving trade and industry.

Social overhead capital
While transport featured prominently in a number of economic aggregates, this evidence tells us little about the dynamics of change. Put simply, did transport provide the stimulus to economic expansion or just a
reactive force to initiatives elsewhere in the economy? Rostow leaves us
in little doubt about the dynamic role of the railway as a leading sector
but says nothing of the other transport modes. Figures in the ﬁrst section
of this chapter show that most transport infrastructure and services grew
more rapidly than national income throughout the period. This suggests,
perhaps, that the transport sector was playing a leading rather than a
following role in the accelerated growth of the British economy from the
late eighteenth century. However, it does not preclude the possibility that
this represented periods of catch-up by transport providers.
A helpful manner of extending this analysis is through transport’s role
as the major form of social overhead capital (SOC) in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Investment in an economy can usefully be divided
into SOC, which supports production across the economy (for example
transport, education), or directly productive activities, which involve speciﬁc types of production (for example manufacturing). Hirschman (1958),
who developed this model, believed expansion in industrial output would
stretch the ﬁnite resources of SOC and thereby encourage increased
investment in transport, communications, education and health. Thus,
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SOC is seen as a passive reactor. Alternatively, it has been argued that
investment in SOC, by improving the infrastructure for production, can
induce directly productive investment in a process referred to as development by excess social overhead capital.
Investing in transport infrastructure ahead of demand is most likely to
occur where government plays a proactive role in stimulating economic
development. Even in an economy dominated by private investment decisions, transport infrastructures can be built ahead of demand. The belief
in transport as a universal panacea for economic backwardness together
with the success of early projects often led to investment and construction ahead of demand, as perhaps is illustrated by the ‘mania’ phases
that characterised transport development. The success of the earliest and
most viable projects stimulated a ‘demonstration effect’: industrialists
hoped that further investment would yield similar industrial beneﬁts
and would avoid ‘trade diversion’ to neighbouring areas where the transport infrastructure had already been improved, while investors hoped for
similar rates of return to earlier projects. In fact, the fears and expectations were often overstated, since the earlier investments were often the
most promising. The lack of proﬁtability of many later railway lines and
canals became notorious; the demand for them did not yet exist, and in
some cases never would.
State provision of subventions to a few steamship companies to carry
the mail to areas where there was little commercial trade provides another example of development by excess social overhead capital. From
1839 the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company was paid a subvention by
the British government to carry mail to Mexico, Panama, Colombia,
Venezuela and the West Indies, while the Paciﬁc Steam Navigation Company began a similar service to the west coast of South America in the
following year. In the early 1850s, mail contract payments to the West
Indies and Brazil were three times the postage revenue thereby generated (Daunton 1985: 159). Such evidence has caused one writer to note
that, ‘without British investment in shipping and ancillary services . . .
economic growth in Latin America would probably have begun later and
at a slower pace’ (Greenhill 1979: 265).

Linkages and spillovers
We turn now to look more speciﬁcally at transport’s links to different
sectors and aspects of the British economy. Rostowian backward, forward
and lateral ‘spreading effects’ help us to understand the extent of interconnectedness. These linkages ﬂowed backwards to supply industries,
forwards to industries beneﬁting from improved transport services, and
laterally to the local economy. Recent insights into economic development associated with the school of new or ‘endogenous’ growth theory
have emphasised the importance of externalities or beneﬁcial ‘spillovers’
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between sectors. These particularly relate to transfers of ‘useful knowledge’ that enable industries to modernise and individual ﬁrms to enhance
their competitiveness (see chapters 1 and 5 above).
Input–output models are used to analyse the multiplier effects of transport investment on supply industries. In his study of German railways,
Fremdling (1977) modiﬁed Rostow’s leading sector concept to a leading
sector ‘complex’ by intertwining the railways with several heavy industries. Mitchell (1964) and Gourvish have each shown the input linkages to
several key ‘complex’ industries including coal, iron and steel, and engineering. The linkages were strongest during the construction booms; thus
railways have been estimated to have consumed 39 per cent of pig iron
production in 1844–51 and 6–10 per cent of coal output (Gourvish 1980:
24–5). The impact upon iron and steel demand was greater if account
is taken of the materials used in engineering products for the industry.
Knowledge spillovers from railways particularly relate to their pioneering role in meeting the challenges of large-scale enterprise which was
discussed above (pp. 000–0) and the precedents they set for new forms of
capital raising in ﬁnance markets (see pp. 000–0).
Similar analysis could be used in relation to other transport modes.
Ships require large amounts of material in their construction. In the
earlier part of the period this necessitated substantial timber imports
from the Baltic and North America, but also the use of domestic rolled
copper sheet for the sheathing of vessel hulls as a protection against marine life (see chapter 15). The metal steamship drew more heavily upon
the domestic coal, iron, steel and engineering industries. Indeed, Palmer
(1979: 337–9) has estimated that bunker coal represented 20 per cent
of British coal exports by the end of the nineteenth century. Shipbuilding contributed to the clustering of heavy industries in conurbations in
Tyneside, Clydeside and Belfast, which yielded local external economies
of scale such as a highly skilled workforce (see chapter 14). Canal construction had a limited direct impact on supply industries. However, it
provided spillover effects through confronting many civil engineering
challenges such as tunnels, bridges and embankments, thereby setting a
precedent for railway builders and many areas of construction.

Market integration
Quicker, cheaper, more regular and more comprehensive transport fosters market integration. It provides for the widening of markets, the
breakdown of local monopolies and other restrictions on competition,
the decline of subsistency, the opening up of new areas to production,
and improvements in information ﬂows on which producers and markets rely. It can also concentrate markets by ensuring the necessary food
supply and residential expansion associated with urbanisation. Similarly,
improved transport impacts upon institutions operating within those
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markets. Wider markets create the opportunity for larger-scale production and economies of scale. Greater regularity of transport facilitates
the reduction of inventories, thus enabling the conversion of circulating
into ﬁxed capital to ﬁnance such expansion. A more ﬂexible and efﬁcient location of production may result, and provide the opportunity for
geographical expansion by individual ﬁrms nationally and even internationally. Improved information ﬂows, and increased personal mobility,
facilitate the geographical expansion of enterprise.
The impact varied according to transport mode: roads and canals generally stimulated local and regional markets, while railways impacted
more on national markets, and shipping on international, reﬂecting the
different types of service and cost functions of these modes. Improved
road services in England led to the decline of many local markets and
their replacement by fewer, larger regional centres (Pawson 1977: 323).
This view has been reinforced for waterways by Turnbull, who argued
that the economic impact ‘was heavily local and regional’. Most freight
movement was over comparatively short distances, and long hauls were
restricted by the slow development of trunk routes and the ‘extreme
parochialism of most canal companies’ (1987: 540–1). The major regions
of industrial expansion in England by 1800 were inland coalﬁeld areas
with a canal network; particular beneﬁciaries were the urban centres of
Manchester, Leeds and Shefﬁeld. Coal prices were reduced through lower
transport costs and a redistribution of output in favour of lower-cost producers (Turnbull 1987: 557–8). In Scotland the economic integration of
the central lowlands region owed much to transport (see chapter 14).
The integration of national markets through the railway can be seen
in the decline of regional price differences between producing and consuming areas that enabled greater regional specialisation of production.
These included a concentration of brewing ﬁrms at Burton, Alloa and
Glasgow, food processing at Reading, and confectionery at Birmingham
(Cain 1988: 99). Such ﬁrms could be located at their preferred location
and use the rail system to distribute to a national market. Chandler (1977)
has shown the central role of the railroads in facilitating large national
ﬁrms in the United States, which were able to draw upon remote sources
of raw materials and supply long-distance markets. While transport networks evolved over a longer period of time in Britain, railways with their
higher terminal but lower per mile costs helped to create national markets and national ﬁrms.
The integration of international markets in the eighteenth century
was largely restricted to the North Atlantic. Productivity improvements in
the tobacco, rice, oil and bullion trades helped to turn the North Atlantic
ocean into ‘an English inland sea’, according to Menard (1996: 270). Overall, however, Ralph Davis’s verdict that the shipping industry contributed
‘a very small part indeed’ (1962: 391) to the changes associated with the
classic industrial revolution period remains the consensus. Lower freights
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provided consumers with cheaper goods and permitted a greater volume
of trade but stimulated no major industrial transformation in Britain, a
process we now know to have taken longer and stretched through the
ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century.
Harley has drawn attention to the extension of the European and
North American trading economies after 1860 as a result of lower international shipping costs (1994: 324–6). O’Rourke and Williamson (1999:
35) argue more broadly that ‘it was falling transport costs that provoked
globalization’ in the second half of the nineteenth century. Commodity
market integration in the form of spatial price convergence and production specialisation is used as evidence of this early period of globalisation.
They argue that this was brought about by reduced transport costs, or the
reduced transport ‘wedge’ between export and import prices (O’Rourke
and Williamson 1999: 30–1). Primarily, this was the coming to fruition
of the major advances in shipping over the last ﬁfty years of the nineteenth century, although improved internal transport helped to mitigate
the additional wedge of moving freight to and from port.
As well as providing opportunities for increased export penetration,
improved transportation facilitated the growth of multinationals. While
British ﬁrms did not grow as large and dominant in their home market as American ones, they were particularly noted for their activity in
international business in the nineteenth century, which owed much to
the falling ratio of transport costs as a share of total production costs.
Wilkins (1977: 579) has argued that the growth of European, predominantly British, multinationals in the later nineteenth century can be
traced to the speeding up of rail and ship communications, which eased
the problems of long-distance management. Improved transportation enabled better international transfer of technologies, more effective monitoring of employees and reduced uncertainty regarding conditions in
overseas markets.

Social savings
Of the many possible ways of assessing transport’s economic impact, the
most novel, stimulating but also controversial has been a counterfactual
exercise, the social savings methodology, which asks how the economy
would have developed without the railway. The methodology adopted is
to estimate the additional costs to the economy of carrying goods by
other means in the absence of the railway, using data for a speciﬁc year
post-dating the actual introduction of the railway. Thus, it is the equivalent of closing down the railway system for a year. The initial advocates
of social saving analysed American railroads: Fogel (1964) concluded that
the economic impact of the railway was modest, and had been previously overstated relative to its main forerunner, the canal. Within the
broader debates of economic development, this conclusion challenged
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the Rostowian idea of unbalanced development – that innovation in a
leading sector could cause the ‘take off’ of an economy.
Hawke (1970: 241–5) applied the social savings approach to Britain’s
railways. Using the year 1865, he calculated that the use of railways for
passenger trafﬁc yielded a saving equivalent to between 1.5 and 6.0 per
cent of national income, depending upon whether a reduction of travelling comfort was deemed acceptable. Hawke looked at freight trafﬁc
separately and estimated a saving of about 4 per cent of national income.
While his results were not much higher than those of Fogel for the United
States, he concluded positively for the important growth-inducing role of
the railways. He additionally accepted that the social savings approach
provided only a partial examination, mostly of the direct economic impact of the railway, and added to this an assessment of the beneﬁcial
external economies of the railways in the form of induced cost-savings
and growth-inducing secondary effects to other industries. To capture
some of the broader impact Hawke calculates a social rate of return of
railways of about 15 to 20 per cent and notes that this might be higher
if one takes account of changes elsewhere that were not dependent on
railways but were facilitated by them (Hawke 1970: 405–8).
The methodology has attracted as much attention as its conclusions.
Among its shortcomings is the terminal weighting problem; the economy
would have developed differently without the railway, perhaps to rely less
upon transport services and with a different set of relative freight rates.
Thus, the social saving would have been different in reality, probably
lower. Imperfect substitutability between the railway and other transport
modes is a second problem in collecting data. Hawke has been criticised
for the limited evidence he produces of freight rates, which also focuses
on coaches and canals for passenger and freight trafﬁc respectively but
says nothing about highly competitive coastal shipping.
As a comparison, it is interesting to note that a contemporary of the
railway era, Dudley Baxter, undertook a similar exercise in calculating
that to have conveyed 1865 railway trafﬁc by canal and road at pre-railway
rates would have saved the equivalent of 9 per cent of national income,
a not dissimilar result from that of Hawke (Gourvish 1988: 82). An alternative counterfactual model could involve deciding which goods would
not have been moved in the absence of the railways and thereby calculating the loss to national income in terms of reduced production and
trading. Conceivably, this is a more realistic approach, although assumptions about the competitive structure in transport would still hinder its
accuracy. Interest in the social savings concept dwindled from the mid1970s, after a decade of extensive debate that concluded that the concept
provided, at best, only a partial analysis of rail’s economic impact.
Foreman-Peck revisited the question in 1991, asking the alternative
question: how much higher would national income have been if the
performance of the railway system had been better? His reworked social
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savings calculations for 1865, 1890 and 1910 led him to conclude that
‘railways were as important to the late Victorian economy as contemporaries thought, and call into question Fogel’s claim that railways were
only essential in economies like Mexico or Spain where water was scarce’
(Foreman-Peck 1991: 90).
The social saving methodology has never been applied extensively to
other transport modes, probably because it was only the railway that
was particularly novel, unlike new forms of road and water transport.
However, a study of malt movements by canal from Hertfordshire to east
London by brewers Truman in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century
calculated the ‘social saving’ as a proportion of the company’s expenditure. By this means it was estimated that waterways were a 1 to 3 per
cent saving on the roads, while the railway was a saving of only 0.19 to
0.29 per cent on waterways (Jones 1986). Hawke and Higgins (1981: 248–9)
calculated a ‘conjectural, non-factual’ social saving for freight carried on
canals over road transport as 1.4 to 6.9 per cent, depending on whether
the average journey was closer to 20 or 100 miles. Hawke suspects it was
closer to 20, giving a result not very different from Jones.

CONCLUSION
Transport featured heavily in the economic history of Britain in this period. It witnessed the introduction of the railway system and the extension of road, inland waterway, shipping and urban transport structures
and services. Technological and organisational changes drove the growth
of output and productivity, while ﬁnancial innovations and legal instruments helped overcome potential impediments. Strategic, monopoly and
public good elements of transport attracted an uncommon degree of government attention. Besides questions of defence, particularly associated
with shipping, policy makers sought a degree of balance between social
and private returns from transport for reasons of both equity (distribution of beneﬁts and costs) and efﬁciency (optimal levels of investment).
Government concern at the market power of some transport ﬁrms is not
surprising: they were among the largest, most capital hungry, spatially
diverse and thus organisationally complex businesses of the time. Responses to these challenges included the development of close working
relations with other ﬁrms, particularly specialist agencies and intermediaries. For the larger railway companies in particular, new internal information, accounting and labour management strategies were developed
under the control of professional executives within new organisational
structures. Assessing the overall economic impact of transport services is
perhaps the hardest task in light of the pervasive, and difﬁcult to measure, externalities of this major form of social overhead capital. Transport has represented a nationally important form of investment that was
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increasingly productive over time and frequently drove, as well as responded to, change. It was closely linked to, and facilitated the growth
and innovation of, leading industries such as iron and steel, coal, engineering and building materials. The increased speed, coverage, regularity but falling cost of transport services help to support the belief
that they facilitated market integration and economic linkages. The impact of transport extended from the local stimulus of road and waterway
through the growth of national markets by way of rail, to the early phases
of globalisation occasioned by ocean shipping.
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